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Introduction
Soon after the first democratic elections in South Africa in 1994, the Choice 
on Termination of Pregnancy (CTOP) Act of 1996, which legalised abortion 
for the first time, was passed. Since the introduction of the CTOP, a number 
of studies have been conducted on abortion in South Africa. Many have taken 
a health-related focus, but some research on young women and abortion 
has also been conducted, and it is to this (published) research that this 
article speaks. Two facts highlight the importance of this kind of research 
in the context of the abortion debate. Firstly, data from the Department of 
Health indicate that from 1997 to mid-2006, 12% of women undergoing 
terminations in the provinces in which age-related data are available were 
under the age of 18 (Department of Health: 2006). Secondly, the subsection 
of the Act allowing minors to request abortions without parental consent has 
caused some controversy. For example, the Christian Lawyers Association filed 
a suit in the Pretoria High Court in 2003, arguing that the above-mentioned 
subsection was unconstitutional. Their application was not successful. 
The research conducted on young women and abortion is etched against 
a background of change and contradiction in young people’s lives in South 
Africa. In addition to enabling legislation on termination of pregnancy, which 
is premised on the rights-based approach of the first democratically elected 
government of South Africa, various opportunities and challenges define the 
lives of young women. Specifically in relation to sexual and reproductive 
health, the Department of Health’s National Adolescent Friendly Clinic 
Initiative aims to make family planning and other services more accessible 
and acceptable to young women (Dickson-Tetteh et al., 2001). However, 
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HIV/AIDS and “safe sex” programmes define sex as dangerous and individual 
young women as responsible for close monitoring of heterosexual spaces. The 
Child Support Grant, shown to enable functional mothering (Case et al., 2005), 
has sparked controversy in terms of providing perverse incentives for poor young 
women to conceive (a claim refuted by the research – Makiwane & Udjo, 2005). 
Young, black and poor women who conceive are, in particular, stigmatised and 
teenage pregnancy is in many respects racialised (Macleod & Durrheim, 2002).
In this paper I highlight some of the problems in the research conducted on 
young women and abortion in South Africa since the legalisation of abortion. 
The specific aim of the paper is, through this analysis, to draw out feminist 
principles that should be considered in this kind of research. My argument draws 
on postcolonial feminisms that theorise the multiplicity of oppression along 
gender and, inter alia, race, class, age and location lines (Macleod, 2006). The 
paper is premised on the assumption that, in a field as fraught with gendered, 
race and class politics as abortion, regardless of the method used, researchers 
need to inspect the ideological implications of their work, and to be vigilant 
about their scholastic practices, and any claims legitimately made. 
To my knowledge, the ten articles featured in this paper represent all 
published research which focuses specifically on young women and abortion 
in South Africa following the legalisation of abortion. As such, they represent 
the body of “sanctioned” knowledge on young women and abortion, having 
gone through a peer review process. Two of the papers have been published 
in international journals2. All the other studies were published in accredited 
South African journals3. Thus, the dominant focus has been on education or 
health. The studies can be placed into two broad categories: (1) those that 
explore the experiences of young women who have undergone a termination 
of pregnancy, and (2) those that investigate the views of the broader 
population on adolescence and abortion. A brief, factual description of each 
study appears in Appendix 1.
Based on my reading of these studies, the paper discusses feminist issues 
that arise with regard to research about young women and abortion. I first 
discuss the potential implications of how we conceptualise “adolescence”. 
Second, the language used to describe abortion and the “foetus” is inspected. 
Third, citation practices that mask ideological positions are criticised. Fourth, 
sampling issues pertinent to these kinds of studies are highlighted. Finally, the 
lacuna of comparative research and the potential for ascribing experiences to 
an abortion that may be a result of an unwanted pregnancy are highlighted.
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How “Adolescence” is Conceptualised
Central to any understanding of adolescence and abortion is our theorising 
or, failing that, taken-for-granted assumptions concerning the nature of 
“adolescence”. In many of the articles reviewed here, statements of the 
nature of ‘adolescence’ were made as preludes to the study or, alternatively, 
as explanations for an observation. In other words, these statements did not 
emerge from the data but instead formed the taken-for-granted backdrop 
against which the problematic of young women and abortion were etched. 
A number of studies4 invoke a “transition” discourse of adolescence as 
a universal truth. Geldenhuys and de Lange (2001: 92) in fact state that 
“The adolescent’s affective development is unstable and variable in nature 
because they find themselves between the child and adult world”5. This 
“delicate” process, they state, can be disturbed by an abortion. The teenager 
who terminates a pregnancy is, in their words, confronted with a double 
developmental crisis – “adolescence” and abortion (the fact that two of the 
nine participants in their study were 22 years old and three 19 years old 
seems quite irrelevant to Geldenhuys and de Lange). Olivier et al. (2000: 213) 
and Olivier and Bloem (2004: 177) state that the person who terminates a 
pregnancy “is merely an adolescent”. Adolescence is seen as the period of life 
when major developmental changes take place “which challenge the child 
to make a transition from childhood to full adulthood” (Olivier et al., 2000: 
213). These “challenges” are naturalised and therefore rendered universal, 
as evidenced in the following statement of Olivier et al. (2000: 213): “It is 
quite normal that coping with the natural challenges of adolescence can be 
problematic for some adolescents”.
However, such transitional understanding is not self-evident or even 
necessary given the historical, social and cultural variability of what has 
been called “adolescence”. The construction of adolescence in the “West” 
as a separable developmental stage of transition is a relatively recent one. 
Compayré (1906)6 notes “A few lines by Aristotle [about adolescence], then 
nothing for 2000 years until Mr Stanley Hall’s 1300 pages”. Stanley Hall’s 
treatise on adolescence7 is famous for his theory that ontogeny recapitulates 
phylogeny – that the transitional stage humans went through to move 
from primitiveness to civilization plays itself out in a similar form in the 
developmental transition of humans from childhood to adulthood. It was 
only at this stage that “adolescence” started to be seen in the Euro-American 
context as a time that required a moratorium on the assumption of adult 
• 58 • Feminist Africa 11
responsibilities, in contradistinction to the encouragement of young people 
in the 19th century to assume adult roles as soon as possible. Sociologically, 
this change in the understanding of young people’s nature corresponded with 
the rise of mass schooling and the outlawing of child labour (Dubas et al., 
2003).
Caldwell et al. (1998: 137) stress the “underlying importance of different 
historical cultures in determining the nature of adolescence”. In Africa 
specifically, they argue that “adolescence” did not exist prior to colonisation. 
Rather the transition to adulthood took place through social mechanisms such 
as marriage and initiation practices. In other words, the achievement of adult 
status was not an individual matter, with the individual working through 
various crises and difficulties as is the premise of “adolescence as transition”, 
but was rather a social matter marked through social rituals. Indeed, through 
a range of colonial mechanisms such as schooling, the introduction of 
Christianity and an economy based on the exchange of money, the idea 
of “adolescence” has to some extent taken root. Despite these factors, 
there is currently great social and cultural variability in what is considered 
“adolescence”. For example, in an edited collection of research on youth in 
Africa, De Boeck and Honwana (2005: 1) stress that youth is a “plural and 
heterogeneous categor[y]”. Thus, while many young people may experience 
their lives in ways that echo the tenets of “adolescence” as defined by Stanley 
Hall and as taken up by various theorists in Psychology, many will not. Or, 
probably more accurately, young people will experience their lives in complex 
and contradictory ways, sometimes performing “adolescence” in the ways 
described above, and at other times in ways antithetical to these tenets.
Given these contradictions, setting our conceptualisation of young people 
at the “adolescence as transition” default becomes problematic. Yet, the 
deployment of a discourse of transition has potential effects. Firstly, the 
analytical lens is placed on the individual young woman who is developing 
according to a developmental blueprint. The context within which particular 
social interactions occur may be elided. For example, Geldenhuys and de Lange 
(2001), drawing on the “transition” discourse in which “lack” and “child-
likeness” feature, indicate that apparently, the “adolescents” in their study were 
not always aware of the consequences of their sexual behaviour. This, they state, 
can be ascribed to a lack of information or misinformation. Sexual interaction 
is thus ascribed to the individual’s lack or incompleteness. While it may be 
true that some young women lack information and awareness, ignorance and 
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lack of awareness cannot solely lead to intercourse or pregnancy. Heterosexual 
relations primarily take place within a gendered space. Thus, the gendered 
power relations within which sex occurs, and the potential for exploitation, 
coercion and violence need to be acknowledged. The literature on “teenage 
pregnancy” in South Africa has begun to highlight this latter aspect (Wood & 
Jewkes, 1997; Wood et al., 1998). 
Secondly, the discourse of transition, particularly if infused with notions 
of lack, creates the rationale for intervention and surveillance on the part 
of the adults/experts. This theme is taken up in the context of HIV/AIDS by 
Mitchell et al. (2004). They argue that the “politics of innocence” implicit 
in constructions of “childhood”, “youth” and “adolescence” excludes young 
people from the position of knower and in so doing legitimates certain 
kinds of interventions (e.g. the encouragement of abstinence) which may 
exacerbate their vulnerability to HIV infection. Four of the ten studies 
reviewed used their research findings (sometimes in a rather oblique way) 
to develop recommendations for interventions by experts (educational 
psychologists, educators, psychiatric nurses). By way of example, Olivier and 
Bloem (2004: 177) believe that the teacher “has to face the daily challenge 
to deal with the child in a variety of situations where the child is in need of 
meaningful accompaniment with regard to the complex world, characterized 
by changes in all spheres of life, fleeting contacts, superficial relationships, 
inadequate socialisation and insecurity in which the child is growing up”. In 
these recommendations, the educator or nurse remains invisible – the adult is 
assumed to be capable of, albeit challenged by, the task of accompanying or 
mentoring the “adolescent” into the realities of the adult world. The power 
relations implicit in this kind of “accompaniment” discourse and the potential, 
particularly in the area of abortion, for the infusion of the relationship with 
ideological injunctions are glossed over.
Naming Abortion and the “Foetus”
The way in which abortion and the “foetus” are spoken about will have a 
major impact on how the issue of young women and abortion is studied 
and the conclusions reached. While there has been significant debate in the 
international literature on these sorts of issues (Cannold, 1998; Smyth, 2002) 
careful reflection on the implications of referring to abortion and “foetus” in 
particular ways is lacking in the research under review. For example, Olivier and 
Bloem (2004: 178) state that the teachers who participated in their research 
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were “all employed at this school, where teachers were aware of the problem 
of abortions among adolescents, and which seemed likely to supply data “rich 
in information””. Slipped into a section concerning purposive sampling is an 
apparently innocent reference to the “problem” of abortion. To understand 
the implications of such a reference, it becomes necessary to replace 
“problem” with other terms which are more neutral such as “the ‘health issue’ 
of abortion” or even, the opposite of “problem”, “the ‘emancipatory potential’ 
of abortion”? Each of these pre-defines abortion in a different way and each 
has implications in terms of how researchers and participants understand and 
relate to the subject matter at hand. 
One of the major controversies within the abortion debate is the status 
of the “foetus”. The most well known is the contest between Christian pro-
life activists and pro-choice activists. The former argue that life begins at 
conception and that therefore the “foetus” is a person. The latter argue that 
the “foetus” is only potentially a life form and that separating the “foetus” 
from the mother’s embodiment makes little sense, especially as the “foetus” 
generally only becomes viable outside the womb from about 24 weeks or even 
later depending on the available medical technology. However, more subtle 
constructions are being highlighted in the literature, for example, Williams et 
al. (2001) discuss the various constructions of the “foetus” deployed by health 
care staff at a hospital in the UK. These included: person, patient, nobody, 
and commodity. 
Given the centrality of the debate over the status of the “foetus”, the fact 
that it can be constructed in a number of ways, and the potential ideological 
implications of assigning a particular status to the “foetus”, researchers need 
to pay particular attention to the terms they use. In a classic text on abortion, 
Luker (1984) chooses to use the word “embryo” to avoid the implications of 
either a pro-abortion or anti-abortion stance. Nevertheless, “foetus” continues 
to be the term most commonly used in research. I choose to place “foetus” 
in inverted commas, thereby deploying, and simultaneously questioning the 
inevitability, of the signifier. This kind of careful thinking is lacking in some 
of the South African research on young women and abortion. One of the 
questions posed in the questionnaire administered by Kok (1999: 237) is 
“Has an unborn baby got the same right to life as you?”8. Geldenhuys and 
de Lange (2001: 95) refer repeatedly in their article to “die baba se vader [the 
baby’s father]” and indicate that a young woman’s decision to terminate her 
pregnancy is usually because “the baby has no reality for her [translated from 
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Afrikaans]”. Thus, in this article, the “foetus” is given the status of a fully formed 
baby, and parental status is conferred upon the young woman’s partner.  
These seemingly minor slips have major implications. Firstly, within 
the discourse of rights which is so pertinent in the current South African 
constitutional context, denying a person’s rights is tantamount to a crime. 
The only answer available within this discourse to the question of whether 
another person (“the unborn baby”) has the same right to life as you is “yes”. 
It is little wonder that 86% of Kok’s respondents answered yes to his question, 
as the terms of possibility were set a priori by the ascription of personhood 
and the invocation of rights. Secondly, ascribing babyhood to the “foetus” 
allows for the positioning of a woman and her sexual partner as parents (e.g. 
Geldenhuys & De Lange, 2001). This implies certain duties and responsibilities 
that only the most neglectful would renege on. Furthermore, it would not 
be without justification if certain sanctions were brought to bear on the 
neglectful parents of a baby. Researchers need to be aware that implying, 
if only in an oblique way, that these duties and responsibilities and possible 
sanctions should form part of the discussion around abortion adds a particular 
ideological dimension to the discussion. 
Masking Ideology Through Citation Practices
Research requires one to position oneself within a field of literature. Citing 
literature clearly serves a number of purposes, one of which is validation of 
particular findings, especially in qualitative research. Amongst the articles 
under review, Poggenpoel and Myburgh (1998: 733), for example, state 
that a “literature control was done to verify the results”. Mpshe et al. (2002: 
71) and de Lange and Geldenhuys (2001: 248) use a “literature control” to 
“recontextualise data”. What is not alluded to in this rendition, however, is how 
citations can act as absent traces that potentially mask particular ideological 
positions. For example, Poggenpoel and Myburgh (1998), who self-label their 
research as “neutral”, use the Pro-Life Activist’s Encyclopaedia (Clow, 1995) to 
validate their claim that the partner of the young woman who has undergone 
a termination of pregnancy feels guilt and helplessness. This document, 
which, inter alia, equates abortion with the holocaust and calls homosexual 
groups “organised perverts on the march”, was first published in 1995 by the 
American Life League, a well-established and active anti-abortion group.  
One assumes that Poggenpoel and Myburgh (1998) used the chapter on 
the “Impacts on Fathers [sic]” to validate their claim concerning the young 
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woman’s partner. In this section of the Pro-Life Activist’s Encyclopaedia, 
reference is made quite vaguely to “studies” with no citations. The tone 
instead is what one would expect of a fundamentalist pro-life activist group. 
For example, the authors state that “The impacts of abortion on the fathers 
of the preborn babies who go to their “little deaths” are largely ignored by 
hard-line pro-abortionists and the medical profession”. Leaving aside the fact 
that this literature simply cannot serve as a validation of findings as it is not 
even a secondary source let alone primary research, the ideological content of 
the publication is clear. As such it serves the absent trace of an anti-abortion 
position, masked by the seeming neutrality of citation practices.  
Sampling Issues
Abortion is a sensitive topic. Thus, women undergoing abortion may be 
viewed as a vulnerable population – although this in some ways perpetuates 
the (contested) view that abortion is necessarily deleterious. Because of the 
perceived vulnerability of this group, sampling in research that investigates 
women’s responses to abortion tends to be convenience sampling. Of the 
studies reviewed here, only two – Kok (1999) and one aspect of Varga (2002) 
(neither of whom were studying women who had undergone a termination 
of pregnancy) – did not use convenience or purposive sampling. This is to be 
expected. Nevertheless, even within this kind of sampling, there are particular 
issues that need to be taken into consideration. One is period of gestation at 
the time of abortion and the other socio-political location.
The medical literature on abortion consistently differentiates between 
first trimester and second trimester abortions. The procedures recommended 
and medical management of cases are different, as are the potential medical 
outcomes (Huntington, 2002; Stubblefield et al., 2004). Furthermore, in 
the CTOP Act regulations (although perhaps not in reality), obtaining a 
second trimester abortion is substantially more difficult than obtaining 
a first trimester abortion. Second trimester abortions are granted under 
specified conditions whereas first trimester abortions are granted on request. 
Therefore, conflating women who undergo first trimester abortions with 
women who undergo second trimester abortions is problematic. Examples in 
which this kind of conflation occurs are the studies by Majopela-Batka and 
Schoeman (2003) and Mpshe et al. (2002). Although Majopela-Batka and 
Schoeman (2003) acknowledge that marital status and age may influence the 
emotional reactions of women who have terminated a pregnancy, they pay 
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little attention to gestation at the time of the termination in their sampling. 
Over half of the sample of women they interviewed had terminated their 
pregnancies after 12 weeks of pregnancy. Similarly, seven of the nine women 
interviewed by Mpshe et al. (2002) had terminated their pregnancies after 
12 weeks. However, in both studies, no differentiation is made in the analysis 
between these women and those terminating their pregnancies in the first 
trimester. Although Majopela-Batka and Schoeman (2003: 146) indicate that 
their participants’ reasons for requesting abortion “did not include risk to the 
mother’s physical or mental health, the risk of giving birth to a genetically 
defected (sic) child, or pregnancy resulting from rape or incest”, they (and 
Mpshe et al., 2002) do not indicate the conditions (stipulated in the CTOP 
Act) under which participants in their second trimester at the time of abortion 
were granted a termination of pregnancy. In other studies, like de Lange 
and Geldenhuys (2001), information concerning gestation is simply missing, 
although the authors indicate that all the participants in their study had 
terminated their pregnancy in the first trimester.
Other than gestation, there are a number of complex, interweaving socio-
political locations (e.g. race, class, language preference, educational status, 
geographical location or religious positioning of the participants) that need 
to be considered in terms of sampling and the kinds of conclusions that can 
be reached. In comparing the abortion experiences of Israeli women and 
Russian immigrants, Remennick and Segal (2001: 49) found that “dramatic 
emotional reactions are uncommon and, where present, are shaped by both 
social context and concrete life circumstances” (my emphasis). Hence, careful 
attention should be paid to spelling out the social context and socio-political 
location of the convenience sample of participants in order to situate the 
conclusions reached, something that has not always been done in the studies 
under review. The criteria for inclusion in Poggenpoel and Myburgh’s (1998) 
study were: adolescent girl who had an abortion, her parents (if informed) and 
partner (if informed). However, no further information is provided on the axes 
of socio-political differentiation that feature strongly in South African social 
life. While language preference can be gleaned by the fact that the extracts 
from the interviews are in Afrikaans, the authors simply neglect to situate their 
results within the socio-political realities of these women’s lives.
Describing a convenience sample carefully in terms of the socio-political 
axes mentioned above is important for a number of reasons. Firstly, it provides 
the canvass against which we can attempt to understand young women’s 
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responses to abortion. The day-to-day lives of young women in South Africa 
are fractured along the lines of race, class and locality, with vastly different 
access to resources, schooling, and opportunities being a key feature across 
these lines. Furthermore, the meanings of sexuality, pregnancy and fertility 
are disparate and take on local significance, as highlighted in the work of 
Preston-Whyte (1999) and Mkhwanazi (2004). Locating the findings of 
research within these realities is important in terms of increasing not only 
the scientific validity of the studies but also a nuanced and politically located 
understanding of young women and abortion. 
Secondly, a careful description of convenience samples in terms of their 
socio-political positioning alerts us to the analytical conclusions that can 
be drawn. Yet, Geldenhuys and de Lange’s (2001) study gives very little 
consideration to these issues. In the sampling section, we are told that they 
interviewed black adolescents. In the discussion section, we find that the 
young women they have interviewed have “inadequate” relationships with 
their parents. They mention, in a generalised way, that:
“In families where parents make a living as migrant labourers, the 
poor relationship can be further ascribed to the parents’ absence that 
increases the possibility of poor communication, supervision, discipline 
and guidance” (Geldenhuys & de Lange, 2001: 94)9.
And yet there is no indication as to whether this statement holds for 
these particular young women. No information concerning their parents’ 
occupational status is provided to the reader nor, as far as we can read, was 
it obtained from the participants. It is methodologically unsound to provide 
statements of “fact” that do not refer directly to your participant group. All 
the above statement achieves is to further pathologise the participants while 
glossing over the veracity of its relevance to the group under study. 
Lacunae: Comparative Studies
In five of the studies under review, the experiences of young women who had 
undergone a termination of pregnancy were investigated. These studies took, 
for the most part, a phenomenological approach, with the aim of qualitatively 
describing the experiences of a small sample of participants. The results 
pointed to negative experiences, although some of the authors allude to some 
positive ones. While this kind of research is in and of itself methodologically 
sound, what is missing in South African research on young women and 
abortion is comparative data. We are thus still not any clearer about whether 
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the researchers’ findings concerning the young women’s relationships, 
emotions, decision-making, defence mechanisms, and moral standings hold 
true only for this group or whether similar findings would be found for older 
women who had undergone a termination of pregnancy or for young women 
who took their pregnancies to full term. 
This, unfortunately, is true of research on abortion elsewhere in the world. 
Quinton, Major and Richards (2001: 492) bemoan the fact that “psychological 
literature currently contains no comprehensive, longitudinal, methodologically 
sound study that compares minor and adult women’s psychological 
adjustment to abortion”. Studies that compare groups of adolescents against 
each other are also few and far between, although the exception is Zabin et 
al. (1989), who followed 360 teenagers in the United States over two years 
after they had been interviewed when seeking a pregnancy test. These were 
divided into three groups: those who had a negative test, those who were 
pregnant and carried to full term, and those who were pregnant and had 
aborted their pregnancy. They concluded that those young women who had 
chosen abortion were doing as well as, and often better than, those who had 
carried to term or had not been pregnant. 
Both these forms of comparative data (i.e. between teen-aged and older 
women and between teenagers who have different pregnancy outcomes) are 
important in honing our understanding of the experiences of abortion for young 
women. However, comparative studies that use age as a criterion have additional 
methodological problems to consider. Some studies such as Franz & Reardon 
(1992), have found that younger women react more negatively to abortion 
than older women. However, this does not necessarily mean that it is age per se 
that has led to these reactions. As Adler et al. (1998) point out, there are other 
variables confounded with age that may affect the relationship, one of which is 
marital status. Unmarried women are more prone to negative responses following 
abortion than married women. Whether this is owing to the potential increased 
emotional or economic support provided within a marital relationship is not 
clear. What is important to note here is that young women’s possible negative 
reactions to a termination of pregnancy may have to do with these kinds of 
factors rather than age, as fewer younger than older women are married. 
While researching the experiences of young women who undergo 
terminations of pregnancy is not problematic in itself, the process nevertheless 
involves a hidden danger. The lack of comparative data concerning the 
outcome of pregnancy (i.e. between groups of teenagers who conceive) 
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means that researchers may attribute experiences or effects to the abortion 
that may in fact be an artefact of an unintended and unwanted pregnancy. 
Geldenhuys and de Lange (2001) in fact note that one of the consequences 
of the abortion experience is mistrust in men:
“After the physical pain has been worked through, some of the adoles-
cents experienced a feeling of relief … After the feeling of relief, came a 
mistrust in men” (2001: 96)10.
They use the statements from two participants as evidence. One participant says 
that she does not ever want to be involved with a man, and the other states that 
she does not want to have a boyfriend until she has finished school. Geldenhuys 
and de Lange (2001) then verify their conclusion by quoting research in which 
women’s feelings for their partners, their sexual lives and other aspects of their 
social lives weaken after an abortion. Hence, the analytical conclusion is that 
what Geldenhuys and de Lange (2001) construe as mistrust has been caused by 
the abortion and not the unwanted pregnancy. However, would these young 
women not have expressed a similar emotion had they taken their pregnancy to 
full term, given birth, and either kept the child or “given it up” for adoption? 
Without comparative data we cannot know.
Implications for Future Research on Young Women and Abortion
Abortion is, and in all probability will continue to be, a controversial issue. As 
indicated by the Christian Lawyer’s Association’s high court challenge of the 
subsection of the CTOP Act dealing with minors, these controversies take on even 
greater complexity where young women are concerned. Within this context, then, 
it becomes essential for researchers to be vigilant on the rigour of their research as 
well as the potential taken-for-granted assumptions and slippages that may occur. 
As seen in this article, this kind of vigilance and rigour has largely been lacking in 
current research on young women and abortion. The point of this article is not to 
disparage particular researchers or to suggest that their research has no value, but 
rather, through a process of analysing some of the difficulties encountered in the 
research, to draw lessons concerning research with respect to young women and 
abortion. So what are these lessons? I have divided these into two broad areas of 
consideration: political reflection and methodological carefulness.  
Many of the studies11 reviewed took an explicitly, self-labelled “neutral” 
approach. Others12, while not explicitly stating that their research was neutral, 
imply this through their language and discussion of methodology. This 
assumption of neutrality is, in many respects, implicit in the canon of research 
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methodology employed by the researchers, ranging from the objective outsider 
position assumed in quantitative research12 to the phenomenological method 
of bracketing that underlies many of the studies under review.
It is possible (although not necessary) for these kinds of methodologies 
to leave the researchers blind to the socio-political issues. In a review of 
phenomenological work conducted at Rhodes University, Painter (2005: 103) 
argues, that “phenomenological research practice, premised on […] a strict 
adherence to an assumed methodological neutrality, treated the location 
from where it worked, an economically privileged white environment, as a 
neutral and transparent epistemological position”. Specifically, as shown in this 
article, the assumption of neutrality within research on young women and abortion 
may serve to disguise the infusion of the analysis with unexamined taken-for-
granted assumptions concerning “adolescence”, abortion, and the “foetus”. 
Particular (circumscribed) understandings of “adolescence” may be treated as “fact” 
and the politics of abortion that is always already imbricated with gendered (and 
to a large extent racial and class) politics may be ignored.
We therefore need to engage in an ongoing process of political reflection in our 
research on young women and abortion, no matter what our chosen methodology 
is. This does not imply that researchers have to declare a pro-life or pro-choice 
position, as these positions represent a bifurcation that fails to capture the 
complexities of a politics of abortion. The politics of abortion collapses the private 
into the public and vice versa. Complex and contradictory ideologies of gender, 
motherhood, sexuality, religion, demography, and understandings of personhood 
and agency criss-cross public debate and personal reactions. For example, in 
their comparison of France and the United States, Husting and King (2005: 447) 
argue that “discourses on abortion are grounded in politics of nationalism. In the 
United Kingdom, Hopkins et al. (1996) show how psychological understandings 
are mobilised for political gain in the abortion debate. These complexities are part 
and parcel of any research on abortion. Instead of ignoring them, researchers need 
to engage in careful reflection that situates themselves and their work in relation 
to these complexities and that takes cognisance of the fact that writings, actions, 
practices and research on abortion are already carriers of political undertones. 
In terms of research with young women and abortion, there are a number 
of specific issues I wish to highlight here. Firstly, we need to understand that 
the way in which we theorise adolescence has implications for how we position 
young women in relation to the termination of pregnancy. Adolescence may be 
understood theoretically in many ways. It is not a self-evident and homogenous 
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category of human development. Instead, it is experienced and practised in 
multiple ways, depending on context, “culture”, socio-economic status, location 
and gender, and within each of these, in contradictory ways. Setting the default 
mode as a “transition” discourse is indeed problematic. Although some young 
people may experience their lives according to the broad tenets of “adolescence as 
transition”, there is also enormous contextual variation in what constitutes youth. 
We should understand that conceptualising “adolescence” as transition potentially 
conceals the normalised end-product, allows for particular power relations to be 
explained as an individual “adolescent’s” lack, and allows for regulation of the lives 
of young women.
Secondly, the language we use should be constantly inspected in terms of 
its political and ideological consequences. Talking of abortion as a “problem” 
or of the foetus as a “baby” pre-defines what we are studying in a particular 
way. While there is no such thing as neutral language, vigilance concerning 
the implications of deploying particular signifiers is called for. 
Thirdly, acknowledgement of the fact that the works we cite are inevitably 
steeped in the politics of abortion is necessary. Making the position of these 
works explicit, as well as our own position, is part of the political reflection 
in which we should engage.
In terms of methodological carefulness, we need to take cognisance of the 
following. We should be vigilant about what conclusions we can justifiably 
reach based on our methodology. In particular, we must be careful not to 
imply that a certain experience, perception, or reaction is caused by a young 
woman’s age or, alternatively, due to the abortion, when no comparative age 
related or pregnancy outcome data is available to verify such claims. The 
corollary to this is that researchers interested in studying young women’s 
experiences of abortion should consider designing age-related or pregnancy 
outcome comparative research. Moreover, we need to be rigorous in our 
understanding of the implications of our sampling. For example, we need to 
recognise that a first trimester pregnancy is not necessarily equivalent to a 
second trimester one. We need to acknowledge that the conclusions we can 
reach are circumscribed by the socio-political location of our sample.  
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Appendix 1
De Lange and Geldenhuys (2001) interviewed nineteen teenagers undergoing 
a termination of pregnancy in the Eastern Cape. They used phenomenological 
interviews to collect the data but employed an ecosystemic perspective to 
analyse the experiences of these young women. Geldenhuys and de Lange 
(2001), utilising some of the same data, discuss the experience of black 
teenagers who are undergoing an abortion. Using a purposive sample, Mpshe, 
Gmeiner and van Wyk (2002) conducted an explorative, descriptive study of 
the experiences of nine black teenagers who had terminated a pregnancy. 
From this study, Gmeiner, van Wyk and Mpshe (2002) derive guidelines for the 
advanced psychiatric nurse in providing supportive counselling for these kinds 
of young women. Mojapelo-Batka and Schoeman (2003) studied black teen-
aged women’s moral concerns and emotional reactions to the termination of 
their pregnancy. They conducted interviews with seven women one day to 
three months post their abortion. The aim of Poggenpoel & Myburgh’s (2000) 
research was to explore the teenage “girl’s” and her partner’s experience of 
an abortion and to describe the developmental implications of abortion for 
educational psychologists. Individual, phenomenological interviews were 
conducted with a purposive sample.
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Kok (1999) investigated the reaction of matriculants to abortion soon after the 
promulgation of the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act. A questionnaire, 
which tapped knowledge, moral-ethical understandings, understandings of 
social and heterosexual relations, and opinions on the government’s handling 
of the abortion issue, was administered to just under a thousand pupils in 
Gauteng and Mpumalanga. Olivier and Bloem (2004) explored the views of 
teachers regarding abortion amongst adolescents. They conducted focus group 
discussions with a purposive sample of teachers and subjected their data to 
descriptive analysis. Olivier, Myburgh & Poggenpoel (2000) researched the views 
“adolescents” have on the termination of pregnancy during “adolescence”. 
They conducted focus group discussions with a purposive sample of Grade 
9 teenagers. Varga (2002) used focus group discussions, narrative workshops, 
role playing, a survey and interviews to explore the role of abortion in young 
people’s lives, its acceptability, why and how likely it would be that a young 
person would choose abortion, and the commonly used methods of abortion.
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